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L Hawthorne* 
1 Introduction 
Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes1 placed the spotlight on the principle of legality as the 
doctrine which plays an important role in ameliorating harsh contracts concluded 
within the ambit of a contract law regime governed by freedom and sanctity of 
contract. This role was extended after the demise of the exceptio doli in the Bank of 
Lisbon & South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas 2 and elevated to a "general clause"3 or open 
norm in Barkhuizen v Napier.4 Recognition of public policy as the South African 
general clause is on its own not sufficient to launch attacks on unfair terms and/or 
contracts. Public policy requires concretisation, which in itself will be a slow process. 
In 2002 Cameron JA directed in Brisley v Drotsky5 that: 
All law is therefore subject to constitutional control, and all law inconsistent with the 
Constitution is invalid. That includes the common law of contract which is subject to 
the supreme law of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights applies to all law and binds 
the Judiciary … In addition the Constitution requires the courts, when developing 
the common law of contract, to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights.6 
                                        
*  Luanda Hawthorne. BA LLB LLD (UP). Professor of Private Law, University of South Africa. Email: 
hawthl@unisa.ac.za. 
1  Sasfin v Beukes 1989 1 SA 1 (A). 
2  Bank of Lisbon & South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas 1988 3 SA 580 (A) 606D-E. 
3  Grundmann "General Standards and Principles" 2, 3 states that: "This refers to the rules which 
are not formulated by the legislature in a way which lends itself readily and directly to 
application, rules which need not even be written, i.e. rules which encapsulate the situation in 
vague terms and which may cover a large range of cases: abuse of rights or also unfairness 
(abus de droit, Rechtsmissbrauch) as in the Unfair Contract Terms Directive, good faith (bonne 
foi, gutter Glaube), as in the Commercial Agents Directive, fairness or duty of loyalty or honesty 
(honnêté, Treu- oder Interessenwahrungspflicht) as in the Investment Services Directive, now 
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive, but also the duty of care (professionalité, 
Sorgfaltspflicht), stated in this same Directive, just to give a few examples." 
4  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC). 
5  Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA). 
6  Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 88. 
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Thus the open norm of public policy requires infusion with the values of human 
dignity, freedom and equality. Theoretically this could make for discretionary 
adjudication, which raises the concerns voiced by Harms DP in Bredenkamp v 
Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd,7 where he held that: "the discretionary role of 
legality more than any other principle has the power to undermine the rule of law".8 
This caveat in regard to open norms was reiterated in Potgieter v Potgieter,9 where 
Brand JA voiced a similar opinion regarding the norms of reasonableness and 
fairness.10 These reservations are all justified because, as Brand JA explains, "… our 
law cannot endorse the notion that judges may decide cases on the basis of what 
they regard as reasonable and fair … it will give rise to intolerable legal uncertainty". 
He continues to point out that: 
Reasonable people, including judges, may often differ on what is equitable and fair. 
The outcome in any particular case will thus depend on the personal idiosyncrasies 
of the individual judge. Or, as Van den Heever JA put it in Preller v Jordaan 1956 
(1) SA 483 (A) at 500, if judges are allowed to decide cases on the basis of what 
they regard as reasonable and fair, the criterion will no longer be the law but the 
judge.11 
                                        
7  Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2010 4 SA 468 (SCA). 
8  Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2010 4 SA 468 (SCA) para 39. 
9  Potgieter v Potgieter 2011 ZASCA 181 (30 September 2011) para 32. 
10  Potgieter v Potgieter 2011 ZASCA 181 (30 September 2011) para 32 Brand JA says that: 
"Reasonableness and fairness are not freestanding requirements for the exercise of a contractual 
right". That much was pertinently held in Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2010 
4 SA 468 (SCA) para 53. As to the role of these abstract values in our law of contract this court 
expressed itself as follows in South African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 3 SA 323 
(SCA) para 27: "[A]lthough abstract values such as good faith, reasonableness and fairness are 
fundamental to our law of contract, they do not constitute independent substantive rules that 
courts can employ to intervene in contractual relations. These abstract values perform creative, 
informative and controlling functions through established rules of the law of contract. They 
cannot be acted upon by the courts directly. Acceptance of the notion that judges can refuse to 
enforce a contractual provision merely because it offends their personal sense of fairness and 
equity will give rise to legal and commercial uncertainty." Brand JA relies on Brisley v Drotsky 
2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) paras 21-24, 93-95; Maphango v Aengus Lifestyle Properties 2011 5 SA 19 
(SCA) paras 22-25. 
11  Potgieter v Potgieter 2011 ZASCA 181 (30 September 2011) para 34. Brand JA refers to Brisley v 
Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 24; Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2010 4 SA 
468 (SCA) para 38; Nienaber 2000 TSAR 193; Hefer 2000 TSAR 143. 
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The concerns voiced by Brand JA and Harms DP become even more complex when 
considering the impact of the Constitution, which is expressly value-based and 
demands that the judiciary take cognisance of substantive values.12 
Consequently, the use of public policy as a general clause within the ambit of the 
rule of law necessitates providing content to this open norm. Such concretisation is 
currently in the process of being developed. Justice Brand paved the way for the 
Barkhuizen decision in Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom when he held that 
"Terselfdertyd moet aanvaar word dat ongelyke bedingingsmag wel 'n faktor is wat, 
tesame met ander faktore, by oorweging van die openbare belang 'n rol kan speel."13 
The Court recognised inequality of bargaining power as one element of public policy 
but required an additional factor or factors before it can be said that the term or 
contract is in conflict with public policy. 
In order to address the reservations concerning the lack of certainty in regard to 
open norms it is necessary to ascertain which other factor(s) could qualify as a 
requirement together with inequality of bargaining power in order to give meaning to 
public policy. The recent decision of Uniting Reformed Church, De Doorns v President 
of the Republic of South Africa14 provides a useful insight into the nature of this other 
elusive element. It is argued that a comparison with civil codifications of European 
countries, national consumer legislation and theories promoted by legal philosophers 
validates this insight. 
Apart from providing insight into concretising public policy the case also presents an 
excellent application of the Barkhuizen formula regarding constitutional challenges of 
contractual terms. 
  
                                        
12  See ss 1, 7, 39(1) and (2). 
13  Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA) para 12. 
14  Uniting Reformed Church, De Doorns v President of the Republic of South Africa 2013 5 SA 205 
(WCC). 
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2 Facts 
The issue in this case concerns the validity and enforceability of three notarial lease 
agreements concluded between the applicant and the respondent. The applicant 
church owns three immovable properties on which were situated three public schools 
under the control and administration of the state (the Western Cape Provincial 
Minister of Transport and Public Works).15 As a result of Apartheid policies many 
communities suffered a severe lack of educational facilities. The applicant being a 
religious order felt compelled to assume responsibility for providing educational 
facilities to the communities it served. This responsibility included developing new 
and improving existing school buildings on its properties. In order to finance these 
projects the applicant had to raise funds. During 1987 the church and the state had 
concluded three notarial lease agreements relating to the properties and the school 
buildings. In terms of these leases the House of Representatives in terms of section 
5 of the Coloured Education Act16 took over the running of the three schools from the 
applicant. At that stage the schools were in a bad state of neglect because the 
applicant was unable to effect maintenance because of a lack of funds. The House of 
Representatives assisted the applicant and arranged a loan for R1 671 290 from 
Sanlam against security of building mortgage bonds which were to be registered 
over the leased properties. In return the House of Representatives required a 
twenty-year notarial lease to be concluded in respect of the school buildings and to 
be registered against the title deeds of the relevant properties.17 The notarial leases 
were drafted by the lessee and signed by the parties. The leases ran from 1 April 
1987 for a period of twenty years, which expired on 31 March 2007. The notarial 
leases together with the mortgage bonds in favour of Sanlam were registered 
against the properties' title deeds.  
                                        
15  Uniting Reformed Church, De Doorns v President of the Republic of South Africa 2013 5 SA 205 
(WCC) paras 1, 29. 
16  Coloured Education Act 47 of 1963. 
17  Uniting Reformed Church, De Doorns v President of the Republic of South Africa 2013 5 SA 205 
(WCC) para 15. 
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The House of Representatives leased from the applicant the three properties 
together with the school buildings and undertook to pay monthly rental to the 
applicant, lessor, in the amount of R 3 633 plus an amount of R26 188,84 directly to 
Sanlam as the monthly instalment in respect of the mortgage bond.18 The applicant 
was responsible for the maintenance of the school buildings and the insurance for 
the properties as well as for paying the municipal rates and taxes and any other 
levies in respect of the properties.19  
The question which brought the issue to court was clause 16 of the notarial leases in 
terms of which the applicant undertook after expiration of the lease period to 
transfer to the State all existing and new buildings together with the ground on 
which the buildings were situated, without any remuneration.20 The applicant averred 
that this provision was contrary to public policy and inconsistent with the provisions 
and values enshrined in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.21 The lessor launched 
its attack against the enforcement of this term by alleging first that at the conclusion 
of the agreement it was in an unequal bargaining position and secondly that the 
term violated section 25 of the Constitution.  
The applicant's approach follows the test for declaring contractual terms 
unconstitutional as laid down in Barkhuizen v Napier. 
  
                                        
18  Uniting Reformed Church, De Doorns v President of the Republic of South Africa 2013 5 SA 205 
(WCC) para 17. 
19  Uniting Reformed Church, De Doorns v President of the Republic of South Africa 2013 5 SA 205 
(WCC) para 18 and 29. 
20  Uniting Reformed Church, De Doorns v President of the Republic of South Africa 2013 5 SA 205 
(WCC) para 19. 
21  Uniting Reformed Church, De Doorns v President of the Republic of South Africa 2013 5 SA 205 
(WCC) para 24. 
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3 Illegality and unenforceability: indirect horizontal application of 
fundamental rights 
The traditional role of fundamental rights limits the State in its relationship with 
individuals subject to its authority.22 Fundamental rights are primarily aimed at 
protecting citizens in their dealings with the state. Emphasis on the vertical 
relationship between private individuals and the State is also typical of international 
human rights instruments.23 The original limitation of fundamental rights to the 
vertical relationship between the individual and the state runs parallel with the 
distinction between public and private law. Strict adherence to this position no longer 
pertains and private law is no longer inflexible in the way in which it reacts to the 
existence of fundamental rights.24 Thus the question today is not whether 
fundamental rights affect private law but rather how fundamental rights and private 
law relate to each other. 
In Barkhuizen v Napier25 the Constitutional Court opted for an indirect application of 
the Constitution to the case before them. Ngcobo J held for the majority that the 
proper approach to constitutional challenges to contractual terms is to determine 
whether the challenged term is contrary to public policy; and what constitutes public 
policy must today be discerned with reference to the fundamental values embodied 
in the Constitution and particularly in the Bill of Rights.26 Consequently, within the 
context of contract law the effect of constitutional rights in private law is indirect. 
Although private law must comply with the public law of the Constitution, it is private 
law which is interpreted and applied to the relationships private individuals have with 
one another.27 The theory of indirect effect28 involves bringing constitutional values 
                                        
22  Woolman "Application" 31.4(iv). Justice Hugo Black expresses the opinion that a Bill of Rights is: 
"… any document setting forth the liberties of the people" in Smith and Weisstub Western Idea 
of Law 455. 
23  European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950); Constitution for 
Europe (2004) art II-51. 
24  Woolman "Application" 31.6(c). 
25  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) paras 23-30. 
26  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 29-30; Hutchison and Pretorius Law of Contract 
35ff. 
27  See also Cherednychenko Fundamental Rights 73. 
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into private law "through open doors … and not through the window and every gap 
in the walls".29 The "open doors" metaphor refers to general clauses such as public 
policy.30  
Public policy was defined in Barkhuizen as representing the legal convictions or 
general sense of justice of the community, the boni mores and the values held most 
dear by our society; it takes into account the necessity to do simple justice between 
individuals; and it is informed by the concept of ubuntu.31 "Public policy imports the 
notions of fairness, justice and reasonableness."32 Thus it is submitted that public 
policy is the general clause which provides the vehicle to import constitutional values 
into the law of contract. 
4 Constitutional challenges to contractual terms: the Barkuizen 
formula 
In the Uniting Reformed Church case Zondi J33 relies on the Constitutional Court 
judgement in Barkhuizen,34 in which that Court laid down the test to determine 
whether a particular contractual term or the enforcement thereof was contrary to 
public policy. The Court held that in general the enforcement of an unreasonable or 
unfair term will be contrary to public policy.35 Thus the court reduced the matter to 
determining fairness.36 In order to determine what qualifies as fair two questions 
need to be posed: first, if the term itself is unreasonable and secondly, if the term is 
found to be reasonable, whether it should be enforced taking into account the 
                                                                                                                           
28  The indirect application of fundamental rights has the result that the autonomy of private law is 
retained as well as the distinction between public and private law. See Cherednychenko 
Fundamental Rights 75. 
29  Cherednychenko Fundamental Rights 75. 
30  Cherednychenko Fundamental Rights 74. 
31  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) paras 28, 51, 73; Hutchison and Pretorius Law of 
Contract 30. 
32  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 73. 
33  Uniting Reformed Church, De Doorns v President of the Republic of South Africa 2013 5 SA 205 
(WCC) paras 28-29. 
34  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) paras 28-30. 
35  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 51. 
36  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 56. 
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circumstances of the particular case.37 In consequence the fairness test is two-fold. 
The first part relates to the question concerning the objective terms of the contract,38 
ie if the particular clause in the contract passes the considerations of reasonableness 
and fairness, since public policy would preclude the enforcement of a contractual 
term if this would be unjust or unfair.39 If it is found that the objective terms pass 
the muster of public policy the second part of the test is activated viz whether these 
terms are "contrary to public policy in the light of the relative situation of the 
contracting parties",40 or "whether the clause should be enforced in the light of the 
circumstances which prevented compliance".41 Thus the relative situation of the 
contracting parties is a relevant consideration in determining if a contractual term is 
contrary to public policy.42 Consequently, the second part of the test is clearly 
subjective in nature since it involves the contextualisation of the parties' position.43 
The Constitutional Court determined that the first question of the test (the objective 
test) involves balancing the constitutional values of freedom and dignity which 
inform the maxim pacta sunt servanda with a specific constitutional right or value.44 
Thus, this Court laid down the requirement that the contract or contractual term at 
issue must infringe a constitutional right.45 This objective test imposes the unenviable 
duty on a court to achieve a balance between freedom, in casu freedom of contract, 
and other constitutional values, thus placing the rule of law and freedom of contract 
in potential conflict with substantive equality and human rights propounding 
transformation. 
                                        
37  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 56. 
38  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 59. 
39  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) paras 48, 73. 
40  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 59. 
41  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) paras 56, 58. 
42  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 59. 
43  Hutchison and Pretorius Law of Contract 188; see Sutherland 2009 Stell LR 55, who interprets 
the first question differently. He is of the opinion that the first question involves an objective 
enquiry into whether the terms of the contract are contrary to public policy as well as whether 
the terms were subjectively contrary to public policy because of the parties relative bargaining 
position. 
44  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 57, in which case it entailed the right to access to 
justice. 
45  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) paras 30, 36; Brand 2009 SALJ 84. 
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In the case under discussion Zondi J addressed the first (objective) question, 
whether the offending term was fair, by balancing the principle of pacta servanda 
sunt against the constitutional right to seek judicial redress.46 The honourable judge 
pointed out that access to justice is twofold. On the one hand it provides a forum to 
seek enforcement of a contract or term but on the other hand it also provides the 
stage to ask for non-enforcement because the contract or term is contrary to public 
policy because it is unfair.47 The honourable justice emphasised that the courts must 
ensure a minimum degree of fairness.48 In regard to this aspect of citizens' rights to 
access to justice, Zondi J moved to the second part of the Barkhuizen test, which 
was subjective in nature. Zondi J raised the issue of the parties' relative bargaining 
positions at the time of the conclusion of the agreement.49 Thus, the circumstances 
of the case and the relevant situation of the parties were examined, which 
examination involved contextualizing the contract. 
The subjective part of the Barkhuizen test is complex when read in the context of 
Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom,50 where Brand JA held that it is obvious that 
inequality of bargaining power in itself does not justify the conclusion that a term 
which favours the "stronger" party will necessarily be contrary to public policy. He 
also added that at the same time it must be accepted that inequality of bargaining 
power is a factor which together with other factors can play a role in the 
consideration of public policy. Thus, the South African judiciary has indicated that the 
foundational source for unfairness is an unequal bargaining position of the 
contracting parties together with other factors.51 From the aforegoing, the conclusion 
appears justified that with the introduction of the subjective test the Constitutional 
                                        
46  Uniting Reformed Church, De Doorns v President of the Republic of South Africa 2013 5 SA 205 
(WCC) para 34. 
47  Uniting Reformed Church, De Doorns v President of the Republic of South Africa 2013 5 SA 205 
(WCC) paras 34, 35. 
48  Uniting Reformed Church, De Doorns v President of the Republic of South Africa 2013 5 SA 205 
(WCC) para 34. 
49  Uniting Reformed Church, De Doorns v President of the Republic of South Africa 2013 5 SA 205 
(WCC) para 34. 
50  Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA) para 12. 
51  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 para 59. Ngcobo J states that "In Afrox the Supreme Court of 
Appeal recognised that unequal bargaining power is indeed a factor that together with other 
factors plays a role in the consideration of public policy" (footnote excluded). 
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Court has recognised substantive equality in the law of contract, since the 
contextualisation of the parties' position requires consideration ie that the 
circumstances of the case and the parties relevant situation be taken into account. 
The development of the principle of public policy was continued in Barkhuizen by 
Ngcobo J,52 which raises the question whether "tesame met"53 / "together with"54 
should be interpreted as "among" / "alongside" or "in conjunction with" / "in 
cooperation with" / "plus". It is submitted that according to Brand J inequality of 
bargaining power is not sufficient on its own to sustain a finding that a particular 
term of a contract is contrary to public policy and thus unenforceable. Consequently, 
to define "public policy" another element is required to supplement the inequality of 
bargaining power. 
Until Uniting Reformed Church no opportunity has presented itself to specify which 
other factor(s) may be taken into account when assessing the validity or 
enforceability of a clause on the basis of its being contrary to public policy. It should 
be noted that the recognition of an unequal bargaining position as a co-determinant 
of public policy should be acknowledged as being extremely valuable in the 
development of rules pertaining to standard contracts. This closely follows the 
international practice of considering this to be a factor in the determination of the 
reasonableness or unreasonableness of a term.55 
4.1 The subjective test to determine if a contract or term is contrary to 
public policy – inequality of bargaining position 
In Uniting Reformed Church the court addressed the fairness of clause 16 by first 
questioning if it was contrary to public policy.56 The applicant averred that clause 16, 
as contained in all three notarial leases, offended public policy because first, at the 
time of the conclusion of the agreement the parties were in an unequal bargaining 
                                        
52  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 59. 
53  Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA) para 12. 
54  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 59. 
55  Ramsay Consumer Law and Policy 127-213. 
56  Uniting Reformed Church, De Doorns v President of the Republic of South Africa 2013 5 SA 205 
(WCC) para 24. 
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position. In this regard the court found for the applicant Church that they had been 
in an unequal bargaining position in relation to the state.57 The respondent did not 
dispute the fact that the parties had been in an unequal bargaining position, since 
"the terms of the notarial lease agreements were necessitated by the realities that 
faced both the applicant and the (State) Department of Education of the 
Administration: House of Representatives, namely financial resources".58 
It is submitted that it seems trite that unconscionable terms more often than not 
arise from an inequality of bargaining power.59 In the English case of Lloyds Bank v 
Bundy60 the court held that "[W]hen the one is so strong in bargaining power and 
the other so weak … it is not right that the strong should be allowed to push the 
weak to the wall".61 This opinion was followed in Macaulay62 where it was held that it 
was necessary to protect "those whose bargaining power is weak against being 
forced by those whose bargaining power is stronger to enter into bargains that are 
unconscionable". 
It is suggested that such cases of inequality may also be described as exploitative. In 
many cases63 exploitation appears to arise organically from an inequality of 
bargaining power. It is the latter phenomenon which leads to the recognition of 
exploitation as the elusive "other factor" as a co-determinant, together with 
inequality, of public policy.  
                                        
57  In United Uniting Reformed, De Doorns v President of the Republic of South Africa 2013 5 SA 
205 (WCC) para 35 Zondi J quotes from the applicant's founding affidavits that: "… the 
Department, which represented so-called coloured own affairs in terms of the apartheid 
tricameral system, dictated the terms of the agreement, which the applicant had little option but 
to accept" (para 16 of the affidavit). And that: "… the impugned provision in the lease agreement 
was inserted at the instance of the state and the applicant was left with no choice in the matter. 
It simply had to comply in order to fulfil the demands of the state for assuming responsibility of 
the schools" (para 28 of the affidavit). 
58  Uniting Reformed Church, De Doorns v President of the Republic of South Africa 2013 5 SA 205 
(WCC) para 36. 
59  Wertheimer Exploitation 64. 
60  Lloyd's Bank v Bundy 3 WLR 501 (1974). 
61  Lloyd's Bank v Bundy 3 WLR 501 (1974) 506. 
62  Macaulay v Schroeder Music Publishing Co 1 WLR 1308 (1974) 1315 
63  However, in a case where a soccer player is sold by his club to another club, he is in an unequal 
bargaining position vis a vis the club, but it is doubtful that he is ever exploited. 
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4.2 Exploitation: section 25 of the Constitution, the proscription of the 
arbitrary deprivation of property 
After acknowledging the inequality of the parties Zondi J moves on to the applicants' 
contention that undertaking to transfer the properties free of charge after the 
expiration of the leases was inimical to the values enshrined in the Constitution, and 
in particular section 25.64 Section 25,65 which is known as the property clause, 
determines that "No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of 
general application"66 and "Property may be expropriated only in terms of law of 
general application and subject to compensation".67 
Expropriation is the acquisition of ownership by the State through a legal process, 
against compensation.68 Expropriation in the form of the acquisition of property 
involves compensation and the participation of the owner to a certain extent, as he 
or she may make representations regarding factors to be considered in the 
determination of the amount of compensation.69 It also constitutes an administrative 
action, since only the State may expropriate. This administrative action must be in 
line with sections 25 and 33 of the Constitution, the Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act70 and the Expropriation Act.71 The authors Mostert and Pope hold that 
                                        
64  Uniting Reformed Church, De Doorns v President of the Republic of South Africa 2013 5 SA 205 
(WCC) para 37. 
65  The relevant parts of s 25 are the following:  
No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, and no 
law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property. Property may be expropriated only in 
terms of law of general application (a) for a public purpose or in the public interest; and 
(b) subject to compensation, the amount of which and the time and manner of payment 
of which have either been agreed to by those affected or decided or approved by a court. 
(c) The amount of the compensation and the time and manner of payment must be just 
and equitable, reflecting an equitable balance between the public interest and the 
interests of those affected, having regard to all relevant circumstances, including (d) the 
current use of the property; (e) the history of the acquisition and use of the property; (f) 
the market value of the property; (g) the extent of direct state investment and subsidy in 
the acquisition and beneficial capital improvement of the property; and (h) the purpose of 
the expropriation. 
66  Section 25(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
67  Section 25(2)(b) of the Constitution. 
68  Mostert and Pope Principles of the Law of Property 188; Wille, Du Bois and Bradfield Wille's 
Principles 517; Badenhorst, Pienaar and Moster Silberberg and Schoeman's Law of Property 172-
173. 
69  Mostert and Pope Principles of the Law of Property 188. 
70  Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. 
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expropriation takes place only when it is in the public interest or for a public 
purpose.72  
It is necessary to point out that the so-called expropriation in the Uniting Reformed 
Church case does not constitute an expropriation in terms of the above legislation. It 
involves an expropriation by way of a contract, which is limited by the rules of 
contract law. The limiting rule applicable in this case is the doctrine of legality. If a 
contract is found to be contrary to public policy it is unenforceable. The question is 
consequently if clause 16 of the notarial deed may be considered contrary to public 
policy. It was argued for the applicant that clause 16 was contrary to section 25,73 
which implies direct horizontal application. However, as was pointed out earlier, 
Zondi J followed the precedent set by the Constitutional Court in Barkhuizen and 
applied the Bill of Rights indirectly through the open norm of public policy, coming to 
the conclusion that clause 16 in the notarial leases was unenforceable.74  
Raising section 25 of the Constitution in support of the argument that an 
expropriation without compensation is contrary to public policy has both a literal and 
a philosophical impact on interpreting public policy. In the Uniting Reformed Church 
case it has a literal impact because clause 16 is in direct conflict with the law as set 
out in section 25 of the Constitution. Clause 16 authorises the "arbitrary deprivation 
of property" and is consequently unenforceable.75 The court found no reasons which 
could justify the deprivation of the property,76 and considered clause 16 "a disguised 
form of expropriation".77 
                                                                                                                           
71  Expropriation Act 63 of 1975. 
72  Mostert and Pope Principles of the Law of Property 188. 
73  Uniting Reformed Church, De Doorns v President of the Republic of South Africa 2013 5 SA 205 
(WCC) para 37. 
74  Uniting Reformed Church, De Doorns v President of the Republic of South Africa 2013 5 SA 205 
(WCC) para 40. 
75  Uniting Reformed Church, De Doorns v President of the Republic of South Africa 2013 5 SA 205 
(WCC) paras 39, 40. 
76  Uniting Reformed Church, De Doorns v President of the Republic of South Africa 2013 5 SA 205 
(WCC) para 40. 
77  Uniting Reformed Church, De Doorns v President of the Republic of South Africa 2013 5 SA 205 
(WCC) para 41. 
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Essentially section 25, the property clause, provides protection against exploitation. 
In this case it is clear that the enforcement of the agreement would have resulted in 
the exploitation of the applicant. Nevertheless, what is important here is the fact that 
the element of exploitation might be thought to play a role complementary to the 
inequality of bargaining power, as the obscure "other" factor to be taken into 
account when determining public policy. It is submitted that from this case it is 
possible to deduce that the element of exploitation may be recognised as the other 
factor to be taken account of, together with an inequality between the parties, when 
deciding whether an unfair contract or term is unenforceable because it is contrary 
to public policy. Furthermore, coupling inequality to exploitation should harness the 
discretionary role of public policy and as such address the honourable Brand JA and 
Harm DP's concerns regarding the width of application of this open norm. 
The conclusion that exploitation together with inequality can be used to define public 
policy may also be drawn from comparative and extra judicial research. Some of the 
European codifications, national consumer legislation and the philosopher 
Wertheimer emphasise the link between inequality and exploitation. 
5 Exploitation: Wertheimer's hypothesis of the element of 
exploitation, the European Civil Codes and national and international 
consumer legislation 
The seminal work by Alan Wertheimer78 on the subject of "exploitation" provides 
certainty that exploitation constitutes a fitting additional factor as required by our 
judiciary. Wertheimer has identified that an inequality of bargaining power spawns 
exploitation and that the latter has its roots in inequality of bargaining power.79 From 
his thesis it is submitted that inequality of bargaining power and exploitation 
constitute the two sides of the public policy coin and consequently constitute the 
requirements for supporting a claim that an unfair term or agreement is in 
contravention of public policy. Wertheimer defines exploitation simply as where A 
                                        
78  Wertheimer Exploitation. 
79  Werthiemer Exploitation 264. 
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exploits B when A takes unfair advantage of B.80 The author Goodin sets out four 
conditions that have to be present in order for weakness to be exploitable. He 
requires first that the parties must be in an asymmetrical relationship; secondly that 
the subordinate party must need the resource that the superordinate supplies; 
thirdly that the subordinate party must depend upon some particular superordinate 
for the supply of the resources needed; and finally that the superordinate enjoys a 
discretionary control over the resources that the subordinate needs.81 If these 
requirements are applied to the facts of the Uniting Reformed Church case, all of 
them are met. There is no doubt that the Church was in an unequal bargaining 
position vis-a-vis the State, that the Church needed the State's intervention to assist 
in raising funds, that the Church required the State's educational resources and that 
the State had discretionary control in aiding the Church to obtain the assistance 
needed. Consequently, it is possible to draw the conclusion that the undertaking to 
transfer the properties to the State free of charge upon expiration of the lease was 
clearly exploitative on a literal level.  
Identification of exploitation as a suitable co-determinant with the inequality of 
bargaining power in order to establish what is meant by "public policy" is also 
supported by international codifications and directives. In Germany article 138(2) of 
the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch provides: 
Nichtig ist insbesondere ein Rechtsgeschäft, durch das jemand unter Ausbeutung 
der Zwangslage, der Unerfahrenheit, des Mangels an Urteilsvermögen oder der 
erheblichen Willensschwäche eines anderen sich oder einem Dritten für eine 
Leistung Vermögensvorteile versprechen oder gewähren lässt, die in einem 
auffälligen Missverhältnis zu der Leistung stehen.82 
The Swiss Civil Code of Obligations83 states in article 21(1): 
                                        
80  Wertheimer Exploitation 10. See also Goodin "Reasons for Welfare" 37. 
81  Goodin "Reasons for Welfare" 37. 
82  Article 138(2) of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch: "A transaction wherein someone exploits the 
necessity, lack of experience, lack of discernment or lack of willpower of another, obtains 
monetary advantage or a promise to be granted monetary advantage out of proportion to his 
own performance is void." Translation sourced from www.fd.ul.pt. 
83  Part 5 of the Swiss Civil Code of Obligations. Translation sourced from 
www.admin.ch/ch/e/rs/2/220.en.pdf. 
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Wird ein offenbares Misverhältnis zwischen der Leistung und der Gegenleistung 
durch einen Vertrag begründet, dessen Abschluss von dem einem Teil durch 
Ausbeutung der Notlage, der Unerfahrenheit oder des Leichtsinns des andern 
herbeigefürht worden ist, so kann der Verletzte innerhalb Jahresfrist erklären, dass 
er den Vertrag nicht halte, und das schon Geleistete zuruckverlangen.84 
Both of these articles provide robust protection to an individual who is unfairly taken 
advantage of. 
Globally the most recent document on consumer law is the Regulation on the 
Common European Sales Law (hereafter referred to as the CESL),85 which is also 
explicit in its dealing with exploitation, since the proposed Regulation uses the words 
"unfair exploitation" in the heading to Article 51. The question of whether "fair 
exploitation" is possible and allowed will be left open.86 CESL provides in Article 51(b) 
that exploitation of the other party's dependency, trust, economic distress, urgent 
need, improvidence, ignorance or inexperience, by taking an excessive benefit or 
unfair advantage constitutes a ground for voiding a contract on account of a defect 
in consent. Another important addition is that the CESL declares agreements dealing 
with terms in consumer contracts not individually negotiated to be unfair if they 
cause a significant imbalance in rights and duties to the detriment of the consumer, 
contrary to good faith and fair dealing.87 
In a national context the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 (CPA) also provides 
support for the notion that exploitation could be recognised as a factor 
complementary to inequality. The CPA provides that an agreement "is unfair, 
unreasonable or unjust"88 if the terms "... are so adverse to the consumer as to be 
                                        
84  Article 21(1) of the Swiss Civil Code of Obligations: "Where there is a clear discrepancy between 
performance and consideration under a contract concluded as a result of one part's exploitation 
of the other's thoughtlessness, the injured party may declare within one year that he will not 
honour the contract and demand restitution of any performance already made." A 21(2) states: 
"The one year period commences on conclusion of the contract". Translation sourced from 
www.admin.ch/ch/e/rs/2/220.en.pdf  
85  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union on 
a Common European Sales Law (2011). 
86  Wertheimer Exploitation 13ff. 
87  Article 83 of the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council of the 
European Union on a Common European Sales Law (2011). 
88  Section 48(1)(ii) of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008. 
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inequitable".89 It is not difficult to come to the conclusion that exploitation would 
qualify as an example of a term which is excessively adverse. 
These articles in the German and Swiss Civil Codes, the CESL and the Consumer 
Protection Act, together with Wertheimer's thesis, have been instrumental in 
identifying the element of exploitation as complementing that of inequality as a co-
determinant of public policy. 
6 Conclusion 
This case is interesting on two levels. First, the court gave cognisance to the 
Constitutional Court's decision not to apply constitutional rights directly but to follow 
the indirect horizontal route using the open norm of public policy as the vehicle to 
introduce constitutional rights into the law of contract. If the court had decided to 
apply constitutional rights directly, the first step in the Barkhuizen formula which 
entails balancing the freedom of contract against a constitutional right, which in this 
case would have been section 25 of the Constitution, would have resulted in the 
agreement being found unenforceable since it was contrary to the Constitution. 
Indirect horizontal application necessitated using an open norm to test for 
enforceability, which once again brought public policy into the spotlight. There can 
no longer be any doubt that public policy is contract law's open norm of choice. 
Secondly, the court reiterated the requirement of determining public policy with 
reference to the inequality of bargaining power together with another factor which 
was first mooted in Afrox in 2003. Uniting Reformed Church identified the factors of 
the inequality of bargaining power and drew attention to exploitation, the latter 
because it literally involved a case of expropriation without compensation, which 
qualifies as exploitation. Thus, because exploitation plays a convincing role in 
defining public policy in the South African Consumer Protection Act, European 
                                        
89  Section 48(2)(b) of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008. The fact that the Act defines 
"unfair" with reference to "inequitable and unfair", creating a circular argument, will not be dealt 
with in this paper. What is important for the proposition that exploitation be recognised as the 
co-determinant with inequality to define public policy is the fact that the CPA included the 
provision "a term is unfair if it is excessively one-sided". 
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Codifications, Directives and the work of Wertheimer, it is suggested that where 
exploitation results from an unequal bargaining relationship it provides the "further 
factor" that, together with inequality, is sufficient to establish that the contractual 
term or contract is in conflict with public policy. Exploitation together with inequality 
facilitates giving meaning to public policy. 
Identifying two factors to contextualise public policy will also limit its interpretation 
variants and thus honour the rule of law while still giving cognisance to the 
transformative imperative of the Constitution. The hurdle which the two elements 
form could put in place clear checks and balances, preventing uncertainty when a 
claim of contrary to public policy because of unfairness is raised. 
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